The statement from Baku announcing that Armenia and Azerbaijan had agreed on the text of a peace agreement had the effect of a bombshell in the Armenian media and political landscape. While such an outcome was somewhat predictable, the Armenian public’s outrage stemmed from the fact that the announcement came not from Armenia’s authorities but from Azerbaijan’s leadership. Once again, Armenia learned about a major development not from its own government but from a foreign state’s representatives. At the same time, the issue lay in the realization that Armenia had, in essence, accepted all of Azerbaijan’s demands and preconditions. If Armenia was ultimately going to comply with all of Azerbaijan’s demands — many of which had been openly articulated over the past few years — then what exactly had it been negotiating for over the past four years? It appears that Armenia failed to strengthen its positions on the most crucial points of negotiation and was unable to firmly defend its national interests. As a result, what has taken place can be described as a second capitulation or diplomatic capitulation — this time, not on the battlefield but in the realm of diplomacy.
Another issue is not so much what the parties are prepared to sign but rather when they will sign this document and what security guarantees Yerevan has in general. Essentially, there are no guarantees, and this is also accepted by Armenian officials. If Yerevan is expecting security assurances from the US, that would be naïve, as Washington is unwillingDonald to provide such guarantees even to its strategic allies. Therefore, it is hard to imagine that Armenia — a country of no vital significance to Washington — would receive such assurances. The EU is also incapable of providing these guarantees, as it itself is facing a serious security crisis due to US President Donald Trump’s policies towards NATO and EU. In Europe, discussions are ongoing about the possibility of establishing an independent NATO and the need for a self-sufficient defense system. Meanwhile, Washington is minimizing its involvement in NATO and is entirely unwilling to take on additional financial or other obligations toward allies.
Notably, in the immediate aftermath of the announcement regarding the agreement, Armenia’s prime minister called the Russian president, informing him about the reached agreements and discussing a number of regional issues. Moreover, reports suggest that Pashinyan may travel to Moscow on May 9 to participate in the 80th anniversary celebration of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) victory. Aliyev’s participation in the event cannot be ruled out, which raises the possibility of a trilateral meeting taking place. Given that Trump’s administration, unlike Biden’s, has shown little interest in Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations, there is a strong likelihood that Moscow will seize the mediation initiative, further increasing its influence in the South Caucasus and over the conflicting parties.
Now, the question arises: Will the Armenian authorities seek security guarantees from Moscow? This is difficult to imagine, given the negative past experiences. However, Armenia now stands completely alone against the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem and has effectively lost Washington’s support as well. While the Biden administration had certain leverage and pressure mechanisms against Baku, the Trump administration appears largely uninterested in mediating Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations. So far, there has been no trace of US mediation in the talks, and considering the complexity of the issue, it seems that Washington has little desire to get involved. This raises another question: What will happen to the Armenian-American strategic partnership document? As I mentioned before, it is likely that the Trump administration does not see this document as particularly significant, and at this moment, Washington appears to have neither the interest nor the time to engage with Armenia’s issues.
Regarding the Armenia-Azerbaijan agreement, Azerbaijan’s new preconditions warrant consideration. The primary one, amending Armenia’s constitution, is a potentially lengthy process subject to Armenian law. A critical question is: what are the consequences if a constitutional referendum fails? Furthermore, Azerbaijan might impose new preconditions. Aliyev recently demanded Armenia extradite former presidents Kocharyan and Sargsyan, claiming all military and political leaders who fought against Azerbaijan should be extradited. Furthermore, Azerbaijan will likely maintain its demand for the “Zangezur Corridor,” which, despite Armenia’s preferred “road” designation, necessitates clearly defined security components. However, Armenia and Azerbaijan remain at odds regarding the specific form and content of these security mechanisms.
One thing is clear from this entire situation: with the conclusion of these negotiations, nothing is truly ending — rather, everything is just beginning. All the international guarantees that Armenia once relied on, such as cases in international court against Azerbaijan, the presence of European observers in Armenia, US support, and other factors, will no longer be relevant for one reason or another. These factors will force Armenia, already vulnerable, to make a difficult choices and decisions in the nearest future.
Originally published at https://mirrorspectator.com/2025/03/15/peace-agreement-raises-more-questions-than-it-answers/
