In a rapidly changing world, all countries, even global superpowers, are swiftly adjusting their geopolitical approaches to adapt to contemporary challenges and issues. The global transformations of major powers inevitably affect medium and smaller players, who are also forced to confront new realities and change the rules of their behavior. Naturally, not everyone can withstand this intense process, and some are pushed out of the competition, becoming declining or failed states. Only those who can accurately navigate these processes, correctly assess challenges, anticipate possible scenarios of change, and implement an adequate foreign policy in line with global trends emerge victorious.
Unfortunately, none of this applies to today’s Armenia, which struggles to find its proper place within global transformations and secure its position under the sun by building a free and safe state. From this perspective, Armenia’s situation has grown increasingly complex as it has simultaneously sought closer ties with the collective West in recent years, but it turned out that the “collective West” itself is not as “collective” as it seems. US tensions with the EU and NATO, coupled with threats of withdrawal and proposals for a Franco-German-led European security framework, have severely damaged NATO’s unity. Even a reduction in US participation, short of complete withdrawal, would substantially weaken the alliance’s cohesion. Conversely, while Yerevan sought closer ties with the United States, it required reciprocity. The Trump administration has yet to clarify its stance on the US-Armenia strategic partnership, a Biden administration initiative aimed at reducing Armenia’s reliance on Russia. Given Trump’s differing priorities, the partnership’s future and practical implications remain uncertain. At the same time, Armenia failed to correctly assess the Trump administration’s policy toward Russia. When Armenia’s parliament passed the Euro-integration bill in its first reading, just hours later, a phone conversation between Putin and Trump took place. As a result, US-Europe relations significantly deteriorated, while US-Russia relations improved.
Armenia’s westward shift has strained relations with both China and Russia. Yerevan avoided deepening ties with China, declining to sign a strategic partnership charter despite Beijing’s offers of investment and similar agreements with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Armenia also failed to engage meaningfully with the Belt and Road Initiative, drawing Beijing’s displeasure. Furthermore, joining the Mike Pompeo-initiated religious freedom alliance, perceived as anti-China, exacerbated tensions. Consequently, China has not had an ambassador in Yerevan for nearly eight months, an unprecedented situation in their bilateral relations. As for Armenian-Russian relations, they are currently strained, marked by unprecedented tension and disrespectful rhetoric from high-ranking officials. This negativity is also reflected in Armenia’s dealings with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
Regarding Armenia’s relations with its other neighbors, it seems that Yerevan is failing to normalize relations with Baku and Ankara, despite the fact that Pashinyan has fulfilled all of their preconditions without exception, making every possible concession for the sake of normalization — yet a resolution is still not in sight. As for Iran, relations with Tehran are also not entirely smooth, especially considering that Iran remains the only country openly opposing the existence of the Turkish-Azerbaijani corridor project bisecting Armenia. Regarding Georgia, a country of vital importance to Armenia, it is clearly implementing foreign policy changes to adapt to global shifts. Having navigated numerous complexities, Georgia appears to have adopted a well-defined strategy aimed at maintaining balanced relations with all global players, including Russia, with which its relations were previously in a dire state. Unfortunately, despite certain similarities, Armenia has been unable to understand, interpret, or adopt Georgia’s approach in terms of maintaining relations with key global actors.
It may seem that Armenia’s relations with India or France are at a high level and that these countries make Armenia a serious player in the South Caucasus by supplying it with weapons. However, this is not the case. While it is indeed important that Armenia is able to acquire military equipment from new markets such as France and India, these acquisitions barely meet the Armenian army’s minimal needs, considering the global challenges Armenia faces today. These supplies are largely symbolic and cannot be seen as deliveries of military equipment in quantities sufficient for the Armenian armed forces to counter a potential Azerbaijani aggression.
All the aforementioned facts indicate the Armenian government’s inability to navigate the external front, which significantly impacts domestic political processes. An unstable and insecure environment presents yet another challenge for foreign investments, whose volume remains relatively small and falls far short of the levels promised by Pashinyan’s revolution. Therefore, it can be firmly stated that Armenia’s foreign policy has failed on all fronts, and the country has not achieved any significant or tangible foreign policy success since 2018.
Originally published at https://mirrorspectator.com/2025/03/12/global-shifts-and-armenias-position/
