The latest developments surrounding Iran, and particularly the two-week ceasefire, offer some hope that peace may eventually be achieved. Nevertheless, this is not yet a final peace agreement. The ceasefire may be established and remain in force either fully or partially, over the short or long term, depending on how events unfold. The ceasefire itself does not mean that the underlying problems have been resolved. Rather, both sides appear to need time to determine their next steps and reassess their priorities in both the domestic and international arenas. One thing, however, is clear: the situation surrounding Iran will continue to remain tense.
It should not be forgotten that Trump previously threatened potential strikes against Iranian economic infrastructure through social media, vaguely referring to “Power Plant Day and Bridge Day.” The specific targets — whether nuclear power plants, conventional power plants, bridges, or other facilities — were not identified in his post. Trump’s statements that the United States could strike Iran’s economic infrastructure, including bridges, power plants, and other critical facilities, could have serious consequences for Armenia for several reasons. At the same time, if we take into account that only minutes before the ceasefire Iran launched missile strikes against several energy facilities in Gulf states, it becomes clear that even after the ceasefire there may still be further actions and retaliatory measures, not only by Iran but by other actors as well.
It is still difficult to say exactly which systems or facilities the United States targeted hours before the ceasefire, but the risks for Armenia are already quite high. First, it is important to understand that Armenia still receives part of its trade flow through the territories of Iran and Georgia. The border with Turkey remains closed, while the process with Azerbaijan still involves only symbolic transportation, mainly for certain goods coming from Russia.
As for Iran, there are already significant limitations on the potential for trade and communication projects with that country. Strikes on transport and infrastructure projects would make Armenia’s already difficult land connection with Iran even more complicated. It is still unclear what kind of damage US strikes inflicted on Iran in the final hours before the ceasefire, making it difficult to accurately assess the situation.
In general, this war is marked by its unpredictability, which makes any forecast about the ceasefire and the future quite difficult. There are several reasons for this. First, there is an impression that Trump’s team does not have a clear plan of action or a coherent strategy regarding what it expects from the conflict with Iran, since contradictory statements continue to appear on a regular basis. The same applies to Trump himself, who frequently makes statements that in some ways contradict one another. This suggests that, at the moment, Trump’s team does not have a coherent long-term strategy and is instead acting according to circumstances as they develop.
It also appears that the current ceasefire may be used as an exit strategy from the conflict. However, Trump’s statement that he would impose 50 percent tariffs on any country that sells arms to Iran may suggest that within weeks he could again consider strikes on Iranian infrastructure again. More broadly, judging from Trump’s policy, one may conclude that his objective during the final days of the conflict was to inflict maximum political, military, and economic damage on Iran. Since the United States became involved in the conflict, the goal appears to have been to weaken Iran as much as possible in all these areas.
If government change in Iran cannot be achieved, then the alternative appears to be to weaken that government to the greatest possible extent, deprive it of influence, damage the country’s economy, and leave Iran isolated and partially devastated while still preserving the state itself. In other words, the objective appears to be to set Iran back by decades, preventing it from quickly restoring its pre-war resources and political influence. Such damage, however, would not affect only Iran; it would also affect those states that maintain good-neighborly relations with Iran and have major economic projects tied to it.
Returning to Armenia, one of the most important factors is that Iran’s power system is directly connected to Armenia’s electricity grid. The state-owned Yerevan Thermal Power Plant exports electricity from Armenia to Iran. Under the “electricity-for-gas” arrangement, Armenia exports 3 kWh of electricity to Iran for every cubic meter of gas it receives from Iran. Iranian gas is used exclusively for the operation of thermal power plants and is not supplied to other consumers. In practice, one cubic meter of gas generates about 4–4.5 kWh of electricity, and the surplus remains within Armenia’s energy system. Other thermal plants also participate in supplying the exported electricity, but the exports themselves are carried out through the Yerevan Thermal Power Plant. Moreover, in 2026 Armenia was expected to export slightly more than 1.57 billion kWh of electricity to Iran. For comparison, Armenia’s total planned electricity production in 2026 was just under 8.75 billion kWh. This means that the Armenian and Iranian energy systems are interconnected to such an extent that strikes on Iran could also directly harm Armenia, and the consequences could be substantial and measurable.
At present, the “gas-for-electricity” swap deliveries between Armenia and Iran are carried out through the existing Agarak–Meghri (220 kV) and Norduz–Agarak (220 kV) transmission lines. Iran supplies gas to Armenia through the Iran–Armenia gas pipeline, while in Armenia that gas is used primarily at the Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant to generate electricity. Armenia then returns the electricity to Iran through the existing transmission lines. The 400 kV transmission line currently under construction — and discussed for many years—is intended to increase the volume of power exchange, ensure the synchronized operation of the two energy systems, and expand transit within the framework of the North–South energy corridor. Of course Turkey and Azerbaijan cooperate with Iran in the energy sector, including gas-to-electricity and vice versa projects. However, unlike Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan are not heavily dependent on Iranian gas and electricity.
What may threaten Armenian-Iranian energy cooperation today is difficult to determine, particularly because there is still no clear evidence regarding which infrastructure may have been damaged by US strikes in the final hours before the ceasefire. Likewise, what may happen tomorrow remains difficult to predict given Trump’s statements and objectives. However, one thing is clear: Armenia could suffer from strikes on and disruptions to Iran’s logistics and energy systems, and the consequences could be significant and tangible.
Originally Pubished in Mirror Spectator
