I have previously argued that the United States does not have a strategic presence in the South Caucasus and has never had one. I expressed the opinion that the Trump administration is not an exception to this situation: it also had its own clear interests in the South Caucasus, but the desire and need to ensure a strategic presence there had not been formed. Of course, the South Caucasus has an extremely complex geography: it borders the arguably main competitor of the United States – Russia, its main adversary – Iran, and a strategic ally – Turkey.
In recent weeks, the policy of the United States in the South Caucasus has been discussed quite actively. This is due to Trump’s announcement of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, at the core of which is the idea of building a corridor in the South Caucasus; that is, through the territory of Armenia. The corridor would connect Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan, and from there, through Turkey, to Europe. With this step, of course, the United States can ensure a presence in the region, if the plan is implemented during the Trump presidency.
This will be possible in particular if, as a result of the implementation of the project, American companies are involved in the project of this road as investors and, at the same time, as guarantors of road safety. However, this will be a business presence, not a strategic presence in the South Caucasus.
Yes, the business presence may turn into a strategic one over time if this road acquires great importance and the volume of cargo transportation carried out through it is so large that it will provide a huge financial inflow, both to the Armenian budget and to the American companies that will be represented on this road. Experts argue that this road can begin to bring real benefits only from 2030.
However, from now to 2030 is a rather long period of time: by then not only will the Trump administration no longer exist, but it will also face the period of mid-term elections for the 48th president. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that after making such long-term investments, there can be clear American guarantees regarding the preservation or continuation of the “Trump Road.”
That means that this is a long-term investment, about which – yes, as of today – there may be some American guarantees, as long as Trump continues to be president of the United States. But what will happen in four years is extremely difficult to predict, especially taking into account regional factors. For example, Iran and Russia are unlikely to come to terms with the idea that the United States can provide a business presence in their immediate neighborhood, which has the potential to become strategic in the future.
Of course, the road could be opened and operational even tomorrow, and cargo from Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan could pass through the territory of Armenia in the coming months. However, it is difficult to imagine that their volumes would be so large and the income so significant that it would be profitable for any American organization to make large-scale investments here. The return on such investments could be over quite a long period and indefinite, given the uncertain level of its profitability.
Most likely, Chinese goods will be transported via this route, since their quantity is quite large. The construction of the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” will reduce the time for delivering goods from China to Europe via the Middle Corridor to 14 days. This was stated by Minister of Transport and Infrastructure of Turkey Abdulkadir Uraloğlu in an interview with the Turkish newspaper Milliyet. According to him, after the commissioning of the Kars-Igdir-Aralık-Diluj railway line, which is part of the “Trump Route,” delivery time will be reduced from 18 to 14 days.
The positions of Russia and Iran are important for the implementation of this project. At present, they are moderate and mild, but it is noticeable that the Iranian side still has problems that were not resolved during the meetings with the Armenian side. It is natural that Iran also understands that any business presence near its borders can become a strategic presence, which Iran will view as a threat.
The same applies to Russia. In the early 1990s, when Russia was in a rather weak state, the George H. W. Bush administration tried to get involved in the South Caucasus as quickly as possible, taking advantage of that historic opportunity. However, this was ultimately not possible because Russia was able to return to the South Caucasus, which it considered as part of its sphere of influence.
In sum, at this moment it is difficult to clearly assess the pace and possibilities of implementing this project, taking into account the constant competition for influence over the South Caucasus.
Originally published at https://mirrorspectator.com/2025/08/26/when-will-the-trump-route-start-operating/
