In recent days, dramatic events have been unfolding in Syria. The unexpected collapse of over five decades of al-Assad family rule in Syria within a single day — similar to the situation in Afghanistan — led to the outright disappearance of the Syrian army, signaling the shift in the region’s geopolitical landscape.
Bashar al-Assad’s government was primarily reliant on Russian and Iranian support, the latter even establishing military bases in Syria to exert influence in the Middle East. However, this situation did not last long. The Syrian opposition, supported by Turkey, was unwilling to reconcile with the status quo. At a time when Russia’s resources were insufficient to pursue its interests on multiple fronts, including Ukraine, and when Iran, together with its ally Hezbollah, found itself in a challenging situation due to an indirect conflict with Israel, favorable conditions emerged for the forces supported by Turkey to take power in Syria. The Assad family found political asylum in Moscow after a 13-year civil war and almost six decades of family rule.
These events are crucial for the future of the Middle East, but we must also consider their potential impact on Armenia and the South Caucasus, especially as the same parties are involved in both regions. Turkey has broad geopolitical aspirations. One of its ambitions is to establish the so-called “Zangezur Corridor,” which is a transport route connecting Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan (Nakhijevan) through Armenia’s Syunik Province.
This project has a huge potential to increase Turkey’s influence not only in the South Caucasus but also in the Central Asia and Middle East and to weaken Iran’s positions by limiting Iran’s connection to Europe. With its growing influence in Syria and Russia’s and Iran’s diminishing presence there, Turkey is on its way to achieving many of its regional goals.
This shift in the Middle East aligns with long-standing American interests in Syria. US interests in Syria have long been driven by certain strategic objectives, particularly by countering rival powers like Russia and Iran. In this context we can observe the following picture. For years Russia, the United States’ primary global competitor, was involved in Syria with a military presence to support Assad. But now, Russia’s focus on the war in Ukraine and its subsequent military withdrawals from Syria, reflected American interests, putting it in a more favorable position.
Iran, which is another key US adversary, had also been deeply involved in supporting Assad but reduced its engagement due to its confrontation with Israel.
Assad, whose government was viewed as an enemy regime by the Americans, has left the Syrian scene. The vacuum left by Russia’s and Iran’s withdrawal has opened the door for another actor – Turkey, a strategic ally of the U.S. (albeit a problematic one, but still an ally), which has significantly expanded its sphere of influence in Syria. Notably, it was through the combined efforts of Russia, Iran, and Turkey in the Syrian conflict that US influence in this conflict previously had been minimized.
Israel, America’s number one strategic ally, has also had clear interests in Syria throughout the conflict. With the fall of Assad government, Israel is likely to increase its influence in Syria. At present, the most influential forces in Syria are the US’s strategic allies: Israel, Turkey (with all its proxies), and the Kurds — another key partner of the US in the region.
While the situation is still volatile and not completely under control, the exit of global players such as Russia and Iran from the conflict with the US-aligned actors now playing a crucial role in Syria is a significant shift in the region. The central question is whether Turkey is content with the current status quo. This depends on opportunities for expansion and how much Russia and Iran will allow Ankara to boost its influence in the South Caucasus. Understanding this dynamic is crucial for assessing Turkey’s ability to maintain its expanding influence in the region.
Additionally, it is essential to evaluate the stability of the situation in Syria and the resources it will require from Turkey. Will Turkey have enough resources to expand its influence into other regions? A significant factor to consider is that Turkey’s successes are closely tied to the weakening of Iran and Russia’s positions. Both countries have always viewed their interests in Syria as critical and considered the struggle over them non-negotiable. However, they have been unable to enforce these “red lines,” leading to a withdrawal from Syria.
A similar concern for Iran involves the corridor issue in Syunik, and it’s uncertain whether Iran will make concessions here as well. Notably, Iran and Russia have already made concessions to Turkey over the Artsakh issue, resulting in Russia’s withdrawal from Artsakh and Azerbaijani/Turkish control over the border areas previously held by Armenians. This sequence suggests that the weakening of Russia and Iran began with Artsakh, spread to Syria, and could extend to Syunik or the so called Zangezur corridor. And if Moscow and Tehran could not maintain their influence in Syria, they may find it equally challenging in the South Caucasus region.
Originally published at https://mirrorspectator.com/2024/12/17/dramatic-turn-of-events-in-syria-is-the-south-caucasus-next/
