The past few weeks have been quite eventful with developments concerning Armenia. First was Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s visit to Turkey, followed by his meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and the statement by Armenia’s deputy foreign minister, who said that Armenia could provide a route through its territory to connect Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan — without ruling out the possibility of delegating the security of that route to another actor.
Pashinyan’s visit occurred after Aliyev’s trip to Turkey, where he was personally welcomed by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the airport, illustrating the value of their bilateral strategic relationship. The following meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan should be viewed in the same context as Pashinyan’s meeting with Erdoğan. This was a coordination of actions between Erdogan, Aliyev and Pashinyan. It would be naïve to think that the prime minister of Armenia went to Turkey without an agenda. Even if he had no agenda of his own, it is highly unlikely that Erdoğan would have received him without having an entire set of important issues to discuss from his side. Moreover, Aliyev’s prior visit was most likely aimed at coordinating actions between the two Turkic states, while it can be assumed that Pashinyan went to Turkey with a package of proposals, the content of which is still being kept confidential.
Despite the veil of secrecy surrounding this visit, the prime minister, through two statements, roughly outlined the essence of the agenda. According to the prime minister’s official website, “The visit was based on Armenia-Turkey interstate relations, and the ongoing process is an agenda for establishing relations, which stems from the interests of both countries.” Secondly, Pashinyan discussed the Great Turan concept, suggesting its potential benefits for Armenia, possibly to prepare the Armenian public for its implementation. Pashinyan saw no “problem” with the possibility that Turkey’s goal might be the realization of the Great Turan idea.
“Right now everyone’s thinking the same thing — oh no, their goal is Turan! What do they want? They want to pass through Armenia? Let them pass; what’s wrong with that? We’re the ones proposing it. We ask, ‘What do you want?’ They say they want to go east–west, north–south. We say, ‘Go ahead, what’s the problem?’” Pashinyan mentioned this during his meeting with the Armenian diaspora in Turkey. The visit sparked debate in Armenian political circles, with some speculating Turkey would demand the removal of the Russian military base.
While Turkey has numerous preconditions for normalizing relations, and the Russian base in Armenia is undoubtedly a concern for Ankara, this issue is likely primarily between Turkey and Russia, with Armenia’s influence being limited. In general, as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war as well as the Iran-Israel conflict, the role and significance of both Russia and Iran in the South Caucasus have considerably diminished. This has given Turkey the opportunity to become the sole influential player in the region. Increased pressure on Iran, including US military action, will likely constrain its foreign policy and could compel it to make concessions, potentially temporary. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the opening of the Zangezur Corridor — about which Azerbaijan has recently started speaking with growing aggression — may be something Pashinyan is attempting to agree to, in order to avoid a potential military escalation, which his administration is incapable of resisting. And the best way to prepare the public for such a move would be to present it as an Armenian initiative, supposedly aligned with Armenia’s national interests.
Predicting outcomes in the rapidly evolving Middle East is challenging due to its shifting dynamics. The region is undergoing significant transformations, with each day presenting new complexities. Accurate assessment is crucial to avoid serious consequences. Experience suggests that the current Armenian authorities are unable to accurately assess risks, and this further complicates Armenia’s situation in an already difficult and complex environment like the one we are witnessing today. Hoping Turkey and Azerbaijan won’t exploit this situation to sever Syunik from Armenia, thus connecting Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave with Turkey, would be naive. With Armenia excluded from decision-making, aligning Armenian interests with other regional players is crucial to minimizing losses.
As for the meeting between Pashinyan and Aliyev, it is important to note that Turkey and Azerbaijan have identical preconditions. Both demand a corridor, and both insist that Armenia amend its Constitution — including changes to the preamble and to the national symbols described in it. In other words, Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations are already being treated as components of a single, comprehensive package. Armenia is expected to accept the corresponding preconditions if it wants to establish relations with the two Turkic states. As for the corridor, in Armenian discourse it will be referred to as a “Crossroads of Peace,” while Turkey and Azerbaijan will call it the “Zangezur Corridor,” and other actors will likely use the term “opening of communications.” However, the true nature of the project and the question of Armenia’s sovereignty over it will only become clear once it is known who will be responsible for ensuring its security.
Originally published at https://mirrorspectator.com/2025/07/14/armenia-between-turkish-and-azeri-demands/
